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Abstract 
In this paper, I consider two heterogeneous economies that engage in a currency union. The small 
economy adopts the currency of the large and is highly dependent on its wealthier partner for trade. 
The effects of a currency union, deficit financing and institutional restraints on inflation are analyzed in 
a dual economy with different wage-setting mechanisms. In the model, Northern Cyprus is the small 
economy and Turkey, being the only country that acknowledges it as an independent state is its larger 
partner. Features of the labour markets determine the wages. We make a conjecture that wage 
determination in Northern Cyprus (NC) is conducted with reference to centralized-bargaining and that 
decentralized bargaining sets the wages in Turkey (TR). Hence, the differences in wage-setting 
procedures cause a dual labour market. In order to incorporate monetary dependence into the analysis, 
we let the Turkish central bank to decide on the economic policy measures, in this case the inflation 
rate and unemployment. The institutional restraints such as economic sanctions increase the 
inflexibility in the NC and cause shocks to affect the economy more. In order to compensate for the 
losses that might be endured by the government in NC, TR finances the budget deficit of NC. 
Therefore, TR government needs to consider the burden of this financing issue.  
 
1. Introduction 
Small island states are known to be quite vulnerable to economic shocks and Northern 
Cyprus (NC) is no exemption. Small domestic market size, limited resource base, 
uncertainty of supply, high dependence on trade, dependence on external finance are 
among the main factors of this vulnerability (Armstrong and Read,1998; Witter et al., 
2002). Armstrong and Read (1998) claim that trade dependence limits the policy 
alternatives for small state governments under flexible exchange rates and therefore, 
they prefer either to peg their currencies to a hard currency such as the US dollar or 
directly adopt it.  
The costs incurred by adopting a hard currency is assumed to be relatively low 
compared to the costs of an independent currency apart from giving up the control 
                                                 
 Paper presented at the III Workshop on Economics of the Mediterranean, CREMed, Barcelona, 2012. 
Northern Cyprus  S. Kayam 
over inflation and interest rates. Alesina and Barro (2002) claim that the „adoption of 
the currency of a low-inflation anchor country buys credibility‟. In fact, the ERM is 
usually evaluated as a way to export the monetary stability in Germany, the low-
inflation member of the system (Svensson, 1993). Notwithstanding, adopting a 
currency whether in the form of currency or monetary union has its advantages in real 
terms as well. Read (2004) attributes the growth success of small states to “their very 
effective use of a restricted domestic policy portfolio” and relates this effectiveness to 
exogenously determined “major macroeconomic indicators such as monetary policy, 
inflation and the exchange rate.”  
However, these benefits arise under normal conditions, such as free trade, access to 
international financial markets etc. On the other hand, Northern Cyprus, 
acknowledged only by Turkey as an independent state, faces economic sanctions 
including trade embargo from the international community and has no access to 
international financial markets.  Therefore, the government had to adopt the Turkish 
lira as domestic currency and the economy depends highly on Turkey for trade. 
Moreover, the international sanctions adopted restrict the external financing available 
to the NC government. Turkey (TR) gives loans and/or grants to NC to finance its 
balance of payments deficits and its government spending each year. Loans and grants 
from Turkey have financed a significant share of government expenditures of NC in 
the past. In the 1977-86 decade, these loans, granted each year, have never been lower 
than 30% of government spending and even reached to 64% in 1982. In the following 
20 years until 2005, the share of government expenditures financed by Turkish grants 
remained within the band between 10-30 %. 
This study analyses the effects of institutional factors, monetary union and of deficit 
financing in a dual economy with different wage-setting mechanisms on inflation in 
the context of NC. I consider two heterogeneous economies that engage in a currency 
union. The small economy adopts the currency of the large economy and it is highly 
dependent on its wealthier partner for trade. Features of the labour markets determine 
the wages. The difference in wage-setting procedures cause a dual labour market 
usually defined as „the co-existence of high and low wage sectors‟ (Fields, 2007).  In 
order to incorporate monetary dependence into the analysis, we let the Turkish central 
bank to decide on the economic policy measures, in this case the inflation rate and 
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unemployment. In order to compensate for the losses that might be endured by the 
government in NC, TR can finance the budget deficit of NC. Therefore, TR 
government needs to consider the burden of this financing issue.  
The paper is designed in the following fashion: Section 2 briefly summarizes the 
relevant literature on wage-setting in monetary/currency union models. Section 3 
describes the framework with reference to the NC case. The following section 
develops the model in two parts, small and large economy. Section 5 describes the 
solution process, reports the findings and evaluates the propositions. Consecutively, 
The chapter concludes with a summary.  
2. Literature 
The large literature on the interaction between monetary policy and wage setting can 
be examined in two main strands. The first strand that finds its most compelling 
works in Barro and Gordon (1983) and Cukierman and Lippi (1999) assume that 
unions are concerned about inflation and thus they internalize the adverse effects of 
inflation. In the second, on the other hand, union totally ignores the inflation in 
determining wages and the central bank responds to nominal wages. This literature is 
mainly associated with various studies of Soskice and Iversen.  
The response of the central bank is restricted if the country is part of a monetary or 
currency union. In a monetary union, the common central bank is assumed to decide 
on the policy measures taking the whole economy into consideration. On the other 
hand, if there is asymmetric currency union then the country, which unilaterally 
adopts a currency, loses control over domestic prices. 
In his seminal work on the theory of optimum currency area, Mundell (1961) 
emphasizes that inflation depends on the “willingness of central authorities to allow 
unemployment in deficit regions”. Assuming a currency area with two regions, a shift 
of demand from one region to the other causes inflation in the expanding and 
unemployment in the contracting regions. If the central authority opts for price 
stability then unemployment is aggravated. In other words, under currency union it is 
not possible to solve both the unemployment and the inflation problem. Peters (1995) 
proposes three alternatives to restore labour market equilibrium in the contracting 
Northern Cyprus  S. Kayam 
region after the demand shock. First alternative is to decrease nominal wages. Second 
is to allow or motivate immigration to the expanding region and the third is to adopt a 
fiscal expansion in the contracting region.  
In models that analyse the role of union behaviour on inflation and/or price stability, 
economists concentrate on two scenarios, i.e. unions internalize price changes or 
ignore inflation. Various papers consider both of the scenarios in examining the 
interaction of wage setting and monetary policy. The degree of centralization of 
unions is influential in determining the level of real wages (Calmfors and Driffill, 
1988). Both a very high degree of centralization and of decentralization leads to 
relatively lower real wages whereas intermediate level of centralization such as 
unions organised at industry level cause wages to be higher. When centralization is 
high, unions taking the influence of nominal wage increases on prices internalize 
price changes and thus inflation. On the other hand, in case the unions are highly 
decentralized and small, they are indifferent to inflation and they cannot increase 
wages as much as to affect inflation.  
Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) consider the strategic behaviour of the union and the 
government in the case of monetary expansion and establish that the unions are better 
off accepting lower wages which mean lower inflation and unemployment if they care 
about inflation and that the unions are likely to increase wages if they do not take 
inflation into consideration.  
It is not only the internalization of price changes by the unions that influence the wage 
setting behaviour but also the anticipation of government policies. Iversen (1998) 
claims that in the case that unions anticipate an accommodating monetary or fiscal 
policy after wage increases then both wages and prices are likely to rise. Therefore, 
accommodating and non-accommodating policies have different unemployment 
performances. In a centralized bargaining structure an accommodating policy causes 
the unemployment level to be low same as the case of non-accommodating policy 
with decentralized wage setting. In contrast, centralized wage setting with non-
accommodating policy and decentralized wage determination with accommodating 
policy generates high unemployment levels. Iversen (1998) uses an index of 
commodification measuring the average unemployment compensation rates and 
public sector share in total employment as a proxy for the presence of „public policies 
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that accommodate union objectives‟. This index helps to establish a relationship 
between expansionary policies and centralization level of bargaining. Expansionary 
policies are expected to get support from unions in highly centralized systems 
whereas unions resist restrictive public employment policies, such as privatizations in 
those systems.  
In the case that unions are inflation averse, Grüner and Hefeker (1999) claim that real 
wages and unemployment may or may not be affected from wage changes, depending 
on the monetary policy adopted by the authority. A partially accommodating 
monetary policy leads to increases in both real wages and unemployment with 
nominal wages. In the case of an asymmetric currency union, labour unions ignore the 
domestic inflation since they cannot influence it. In a common currency area, unions 
would not be as influential on the central bank as in nation states (Peters, 1995) even 
if they engaged in a strategic interaction as considered by Grüner and Hefeker (1999). 
Therefore, the participants of the monetary union should be prepared to adopt policies 
to motivate labour mobility or increase financial support in lagging regions to combat 
unemployment (Peters, 1995). 
3. Framework 
The wage determination in these two economies is taken as separate mechanisms. In 
fact, it is the monetary policy and the grants/loans provided by the developed part to 
the less developed that ties these two economies. In other words, this paper uses the 
definition of dual labour market to examine the wage differences between the 
developed and less developed economies of a currency union with a difference. The 
difference stems from two issues. Firstly, the dependence of the less developed 
economy in terms of foreign trade on the developed part means that the prices of 
imported goods to the less developed part are relatively higher than the developed 
economy. Second, the less developed economy has no say in the monetary policy 
measures taken and the monetary authority of the developed economy adjusts its 
policies taking only the developed part into consideration. In a way, the government 
of the less developed economy has only fiscal policy measures to control the 
economy. 
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High wages are usually attributed to the relatively advanced sector and low wages to 
the relatively backward sector by dual economy theorists. However, in this paper, the 
developed sector or, in fact, economy (Turkey) is assumed to have a highly 
competitive labour market where the wages are driven down to competitive levels, 
whereas the less developed economy (Northern Cyprus) has relatively higher wages 
due to centralized wage determination.  
In their model Duarte and Wolman (2003) assume that the tradable good can only be 
consumed in conjunction with the non-tradable good. In other words, supply of 
tradable goods depends on distribution channels, infrastructure etc.  This is quite a 
reasonable assumption provided that you ignore the services sector, i.e. education, 
health, etc, which actually the consumer can easily consume alone. Nevertheless, in 
other to emphasize the difference between tradable and non-tradable goods, I assume 
these goods are not substitutable, i.e. the elasticity of substitution is zero.  
The features of Northern Cyprus determine the main modeling framework. Since NC 
has limited natural resources as many small island states, its output is mostly 
comprised of non-tradable goods. The economy exports some agricultural produce 
and is highly dependent on imports from Turkey. So we are actually looking at a case 
of two countries with perfect product and financial market integration.  
 
Table1. Unemployment levels under monetary policy options 
Policy Type 
Bargaining System 
Centralized Decentralized 
Accommodating Low High 
Non-accommodating High Low 
       Note: Summarized from Iversen (1998) 
 
Table 1, which summarizes Iversen‟s (1998) reasoning, gives us a good framework to 
explain the situation in NC. The dual economy setting we‟re analysing has two 
economies, i.e. large and small. In the smaller economy, bargaining system is 
centralized and in the larger economy it is decentralized. Under these systems, it is in 
the best interest of the larger economy to adopt a non-accommodating policy which 
means adopting strict monetary and fiscal policy measures that help control inflation. 
However, for the small economy, it is better off adopting an accommodating policy 
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with monetary and/or fiscal expansion. Since the smaller economy cannot affect the 
monetary policy, the only measure it has to turn the poorest outcome to best is to 
adopt an expansionary fiscal policy.  Taking such a measure, will have a positive 
effect on employment but at the same time increase prices. 
4. The Model  
In order to analyze the impact of labour market rigidity on inflation in a currency 
union between a large and a small economy, this paper considers the outcome as a 
result of monetary authority targeting the inflation in only the large country. In either 
case, the large economy is assumed to have a decentralized wage setting mechanism 
that leads to a competitive wage, which is equal to the value of marginal product of 
labour. Additionally, the product market in the large country is competitive. In other 
words, the economy as a whole is a competitive economy. On the other hand, the 
small economy is not only small but also an island economy with limited resources in 
terms of inputs and finance. The labour market has a highly centralized wage setting 
structure. In contrast, the tradable goods market faces competition from abroad, i.e. 
large country. However, the public firm has monopoly power over the production and 
supply of the non-tradable good.  
4.1. Small Economy 
In the small economy considered, there is one typical household, a public and a 
private firm.  
Consumption 
The household consumes a tradable and a non-tradable good. A CES utility function 
represents the household‟s preferences: 
, , ,1/
, , , , ,( , ) (1 ) 1 , 0
h S h S h S
N S T S S N S S T S h S Su x x a x a x a    (1) 
and is maximized subject to the budget constraint , , , ,
D
S N S N S T S T Sy p x p x , where 
D
Sy is the disposable income. Disposable income is defined as the income earned 
minus the tax paid by the consumer, DS S Sy y T , where St  is the tax rate. The tax 
revenue is S S ST t y .           
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The demands for each of these goods are found to be: 
, ,, ,
, ,1 1
, ,
, ,
, ,
1 1
,
1
1 1
1
h S h Sh S h S
D D
S S
N S T S
N S T S
T S T SS S
S N S S N S
y y
x x
p pp pa a
a p a p
 (3) 
where , ,1/(1 )h S h S  is the elasticity of substitution.  
Thus consumption of each commodity depends on income, the price of the 
commodity and the price of that commodity relative to that of the alternative. Note 
that the share of expenditure on each commodity depends on the relative commodity 
prices, e.g. 
,,
1
1
, , ,
,
1
1
h Sh S
N S N S T SS
D
S N SS
p x pa
a py
 
and that the expenditure share changes negatively with the price of the good if the 
elasticity of substitution is greater than one, i.e. price elastic good and positively 
otherwise, i.e. price inelastic good. 
The changes in demand for tradable and non-tradable goods are 
, , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( )DT S S T S h S T S N S T Sx y p p p  
, , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( )DN S S N S h S N S T S N Sx y p p p . 
In these expressions ˆDSy  is the income effect, , ,ˆ ˆ,N S T Sp p  are the direct price effects and 
the last term is the substitution effect which depends on the elasticity of substitution 
between tradable and non-tradable goods and on the shares of these goods 
, ,( , )N S T S  in the budget.  As the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-
tradable goods in consumption approaches zero, i.e. goods are complementary, the 
changes in demands become: , , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
D
N S S N S N S T S N Sx y p p p  and   
, , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )DT S S T S T S N S T Sx y p p p . The change in disposable income, 
ˆˆ ˆD
S S S Sy y t , 
depends on the change in earned income , , , ,
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( )S b S b S c S c Sy L w L w , where 
 is the share of unionised labour income in  total income and on the change in tax 
rate ˆSt  interacting with 
1
S
S
S
t
t
, i.e. the ratio of tax to disposable income.  
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Production 
There are two firms in two sectors, tradable and non-tradable, each producing one 
good, i.e. tradable and non-tradable, respectively. Decreasing returns to scale is 
assumed in the production of both goods. This assumption is in-line with the features 
of a small island economy under resource constraints such as Northern Cyprus. This 
resource constraint means that the economy has to use more and more inputs to 
increase its production but these resources are scarce and cannot be obtained easily at 
low cost. Therefore, inputs other than intermediate good and labour are assumed to be 
fixed generating decreasing returns to scale. 
The private firm, which produces the tradable good, maximizes profits, 
, , , , , , ,T S T S T S b S T S N S T Sp q w L p N  subject to a decreasing returns to scale 
production function, 
,
, ,
/
, , ,
T S
T S T S
T S T S T Sq L N , , , 1T S  where  , ,,T S T SL N  are the 
labour and non-tradable goods used in production of the tradable good by the private 
firm and ,T S  is the substitution parameter T S T S, ,1 (1 ) is the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and non-tradable input,  is the scale parameters. The 
input demands are functions of the prices of the output and inputs, 
, , , ,, ,T S T S N S b SL p p w and , , , ,, ,T S T S N S b SN p p w .  
The non-tradable good is produced by the public firm according to the decreasing 
returns to scale production function: , , , 1,
JNLN
N S N S N S LN JNq L J , where ,N SL  is the 
labour employed by the public firm and 
,N S
J  is the imported intermediate good used in 
production of the non-tradable good. The public firm determines the non-tradable 
output level which maximizes its profits, , , , , , , ,N S N S N S b S N S J S N Sp q w L p J . Here, 
, , ,( , , )N S J S b Sp p w  are the prices of the non-tradable good, of the imported intermediate 
good and the bargained wage rate, respectively. The input demands of the public firm 
and the profit are , , , ,, ,N S J S N S b SL p p w and , , , ,, ,N S J S N S b SJ p p w . 
The changes in tradable and non-tradable outputs depend on changes in input usage, 
i.e. labour and intermediate good demands by the public firm and labour and non-
tradable good input demands of the private firm, are: , , ,
ˆ ˆˆ
N S LN N S JN N Sq L J  and
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, , ,
ˆ ˆˆ [ (1 ) ]T S T S T Sq L N , where 
,
, ,
,
, ,
T S
T S T S
T S
T S T S
L
L N
. The changes in labour demand 
and non-tradable input demands are  , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
T S T S T S N S N S b SL p p w  and 
, , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
T S T S T S N S N S b SN p p w , where , 1/1T S  and  , , (1/1 )N S T S  
show the responsiveness of input demands to prices depend on the scale and 
elasticity, ,0 , 1T S 1. Note that 
,
, , ,
,
0
(1/1 ) (1/1 ) 0
0
T S
N S T S T S
T S
if
 .
 
On the other hand, the change in labour demand for the production of non-tradable 
good‟s , , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
N S N S N S LJ S J S LL S b SL p p w  responsiveness to price changes depends 
on  , ,,N S LJ S  and ,LL S . The first two are the output and intermediate good price 
elasticities and the latter is the wage elasticity of labour demand. Since 
,
1
0
1
N S
LN JN
, , 0
1
JN
LJ S
LN JN
 and ,
1
0
1
JN
LL S
LN JN
 then 
we can conclude that the labour demand of the public firm changes negatively with 
,J Sp  and ,b Sw . Notice that the labour demand for tradable good responds to wage 
changes as much as the change itself, whereas the labour demand for non-tradable 
good is more responsive to wage changes, i.e.  , ,
ˆ ˆ/ 1T S b SL w , but since , 1LL S
and , , ,
ˆ ˆ/N S b S LL SL w  then , ,
ˆ ˆ/ 1N S b SL w . Similarly, the change in demand 
for intermediate good J , , , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
N S N S N S JJ S J S JL S b SJ p p w  
depends on the changes 
in the prices of the non-tradable good, of own price and the wage rate, where 
,
1
1
1
LN
JJ S
LN JN
  and  , 0
1
LN
JL S
LN JN
. 
                                                 
1
 , , , 0N S T S T S , i.e.   , ,T S T S  so the responsiveness of labour and non-tradable input to 
changes in the price of the tradable good has to be less than the elasticity of substitution between inputs 
in the production of the tradable good. 
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Wage-Setting Mechanism 
The labour force is divided as those that receive the bargained wage and that receive 
the competitive wage, , ,S b S c SL L L . Those working at the bargained wage can 
either be employed in the non-tradable sector and work for the public firm or in the 
tradable sector and work for the private firm, , , ,b S N S T SL L L . Therefore, the change 
in labour employed at the bargained wage is expressed as , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )b N S T SL L L . 
The nominal wage is determined according to the right-to-manage model in which the 
union sets the wage to maximize the Nash product 
1
, , , , , , ,U( , , ) ( , , )b S c S N S N S N S T S b Sw w L p p w  and the public firm determines the 
employment level. Here, , , , ,( , , )N S N S T S b Sp p w  is the profit of the public firm and 
, , , , , ,U ( ) ( , , )S b S c S N S N S T S b Sw w L p p w  is the union‟s payoff in which ,c Sw  indicates 
the outside option or the competitive wage. In other words, labour that is not 
employed at the bargained wage rate gets the competitive wage as income.  shows 
the bargaining power of the union.  Maximising the monotonic transformation of the 
Nash product gives the same wage rate, therefore the union determines the wage rate 
so as to 
,
,logU +(1- )logMax
b S
S N S
w
.  The bargained wage rate is , ,b S c Sw w , 
where the mark-up set by the union on the competitive wage, , depends on the 
bargaining power and elasticity of substitution between inputs, , ,( , )N S N SL J
2
. The 
change in bargained wage depends on the change in the mark-up and the competitive 
wage, , ,
ˆˆ ˆ
b S c Sw w .  Since 
(1 )
1 LN JN
LN
then, ˆ ˆ , where  the 
share of bargaining power in the mark-up is
 
(1 )
(1 )
LN JN
LN LN JN
. 
Labour Market 
The government either employs those that cannot find jobs at either of the non-
tradable or tradable sectors paying the competitive wage or pays an equal 
unemployment benefit. The overriding reason in this policy would be to decrease 
                                                 
2
 Notice that if the production function of the public firm exibits constant returns to scale technology 
then the bargained wage will become equal to the competitive wage. 
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international labour mobility. In fact, labour mobility is a condition that would ease 
the strain on the government in case of shocks and soften the adjustment process in 
the absence of a monetary policy mechanism. However, it is quite reasonable to 
assume that the NC government would like to minimize emigration for political 
reasons. Therefore, if the government cannot employ those that are not employed at 
the bargained wage then it needs to pay an unemployment benefit that is at least equal 
to the opportunity cost of migration to the large country and taking up employment 
there. The immigrant can find a job that pays the going wage, i.e. the competitive 
wage, ,c Sw . 
Part of the labour employed at bargained wage works in the production of the tradable 
good and rest in the non-tradable sector, i.e. 
, ,b N S T SL L L .  Since there is no 
change in labour force, an increase in the labour demands of either of the sectors 
decreases the number of workers earning competitive wage depending on the shares 
of non-tradable, tradable and the competitive wage employment in total labour force,
, , ,( , , )N S T S c S . 
Market Clearing 
Similar to the labour market, the product markets are assumed to clear. The consumer 
does not differentiate between domestic or foreign tradable good. Therefore, if the 
demand for tradable good exceeds the supply of private firm then that good is 
imported. In the expressions, ,T SIM  denotes the quantity imported for final good 
consumption and ,N SJ  is the quantity used as intermediate good by the public firm. As 
for the non-tradable good quantity, total demand of the consumer and the private firm 
which uses the non-tradable good as an input needs to be met by the public firm. The 
change equations are determined accordingly, where T  shows the share of total 
tradable good demand met from domestic production by the private firm and the rest 
come from imports. The change in the supply of non-tradable good depends on the 
shares of final and intermediate good demands in the total ( ,1 )N N , respectively, 
and on the changes in these demands. 
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Prices 
The private firm faces competition from imports therefore assumed to be a price 
taker. Since there is currency union between trading partners, the domestic price of 
the tradable good is the import price (or the exogenous world market price,
W
Tp ) plus 
the transaction or transportation cost ( ,T S ), which is a function of the public good 
production, , ,
W
T S T T Sp p  with , ,( )T S N Sq  and ,( ) 0N Sq  (such as 
, ,( ) 1/N S N Sq q ).
3
 For the non-tradable good there is no world price, its price is 
determined endogenously in the economy. Domestic price of the tradable good 
changes with the changes in world price and transportation cost. 
Government 
Government expenditure comes from the transfer payments made to the unemployed, 
, ,S c S c SG w L . Since the government needs to pay unemployment benefit, these 
transfer payments should be financed from the tax revenue and external borrowing. 
Thus, the government budget is balanced through external debt, i.e. S SG T H  
where H  is the amount of external finance obtained from the large country. Therefore, 
any change in government expenditure needs to be met by either a change in tax 
revenue or a change in external borrowing or both, ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )S S S SG g T g H , where 
S
S
H
g
G
 is the share of government expenditure financed through external 
borrowing/grants.  
 
4.2. Large Economy 
The large or developed economy is assumed to function under perfect competition. 
The tradable good is produced with a decreasing returns to scale technology using 
labour, , ,Ts L c Lq L  where 1 0  and so the rate of change in the quantity supplied 
is a function of the price elasticity of supply, , /(1 )Ts Le , the change in 
                                                 
3
 The transaction cost can also be thought as an ad valorem tariff or tariff equivalent of quota imposed 
by the government to protect the import-competing sector. In that case, the private firm gets 
, (1 )
w
T S Tp p as the price, where 0 1 is the tariff rate. 
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competitive wage and in  the producer‟s price, ,Tp Lp .   The market demand for tradable 
good is , ,( )Td L d Tc Lq q p  where ,Tc Lp  is the consumer‟s price of the tradable good in 
the large country
4
. It is possible to write the rates of change in demand and price using 
the price elasticity of demand, ,Td Le . The labour market in this economy is also 
competitive, in other words the competitive wage is equal to the value of the marginal 
product of labour, i.e. 
1
, ,c c L Tp Lw VMPL L p  and thus , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
Ts L Tp L c c Lq p w L .  
The government needs to finance its budget through taxation. Assume that prior to the 
grant/loan to the small economy the government budget in the large economy is 
balanced. In that case, the tax revenue collected is used to finance the small economy, 
i.e. ,L Td LH t q . The government levies a tax then the price paid by the consumers 
become , , (1 )Tc L Tp L Lp p t , where Lt is the indirect tax rate levied on consumers. 
Hence, the inflation rate measured as the percentage change in consumers‟ price 
depends on the change in producers‟ price and the change in the tax rate 
, ,
ˆˆ ˆ
Tc L Tp L Lp p ft .  Notice that f indicates the share of tax in price. 
The large country exports the tradable good to the small country, which then uses 
some as intermediate good and some as final good. Therefore, the total supply is 
actually distributed between the domestic market and the external market: 
, ,Ts L Td Lq q X .  Hence the change equation becomes: Ts L Td L T Lq q X, , ,
ˆˆ ˆ (1 )
 
where  shows the shares of domestic demand in total output. 
5. System of Equations and Solution 
The model developed in this study can be used to examine the impact of shocks on 
the rates of change in various aggregates. Therefore, the change equations are used 
and the system of equations solved is given in Table 2.  In the solution process, the 
two economies are evaluated separately. Some variables endogenous to one economy 
are taken to be exogenous for the other. However, this intertwined structure causes 
complexity. Although a symbolic solution is possible for the large economy, solving 
                                                 
4
 If there is no tax then the price consumers pay and the price producers receive are the same, 
L L
Tc Tpp p . 
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the system of equations for the small economy requires a number of parameters to be 
pre-determined.  
For the large economy, the impact of changes in exogenous variables, namely the 
labour employed, the exports to the small economy, the external lending/aid to the 
small economy, on demand and supply of the tradable good, the producer‟s and 
consumer‟s price and the competitive wage can be seen from Table 3 below.  
Table 2. The system of equations used to solve the model
5
. 
 
SMALL ECONOMY 
S1. , , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
D
N S S N S N S T S N Sx y p p p   
S2. , , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
D
T S S T S T S N S T Sx y p p p  
S3. ˆˆ ˆDS S S Sy y t  
S4. 
, , , ,
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (1 )( )S b S b S c S c Sy L w L w  
S5. , , ,
ˆ ˆˆ
N S LN N S JN N Sq L J  
S6. , , ,
ˆ ˆˆ [ (1 ) ]T S T S T Sq L N  
S7. , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
T S T S T S N S N S b SL p p w   
S8. , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
T S T S T S N S N S b SN p p w  
S9. , ,
ˆˆ ˆ
b S c Sw w  
 
 
S10. , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
S N S N S T S T S c S c SL L L L  
S11. , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ (1 )T S T T S T T Sx q IM  
S12. , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ (1 )N S N N S N T Sq x N  
S13. , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( )
W
T S T N Sp p q  
S14. , ,
ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ(1 )( )c S c S S S S Sw L g t y g H  
S15. , , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
N S N S N S LJ S J S LL S b SL p p w  
S16. , , , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
N S N S N S JJ S J S JL S b SJ p p w  
S17. b N S T SL L L, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )
 
S18. , ,
ˆ ˆ (1 )T S N SM IM J   
LARGE ECONOMY 
L1. , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ( )Ts L Ts L Tp L cq e p w
 
L2. , , ,ˆ ˆTd L Td L Tc Lq e p  
L3.
 , ,
ˆˆ ˆ
Tc L Tp L Lp p ft  
 
L4. ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
L Td LH t q  
L5. , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
Ts L Tp L c c Lq p w L
 
L6. Ts L Td L T Lq q X, , ,
ˆˆ ˆ (1 )  
                                                 
5
 In the solution process the price of the imported intermediate good used in the production of the non-
tradable good is taken to be equal to the world price. 
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Table 3. Impact of changes in 
cL , ,T LX  and H on the large economy 
Variables ˆ
cL
 
,
ˆ
T LX
 
Hˆ
 
Demand ( ,ˆTd Lq ) 
s
s
e
e(1 )
 
1
1  0 
Supply ( ,ˆTs Lq ) 
s
s
e
e1
 0 0 
Producer’s price ( ˆ pp )  
d s
d s
e f e
e e
1
1
 d
d
e f
e
1
( 1)  f  
Consumer’s price ( ˆ ˆWc Tp p )  
s
d s
e
e e
1
1
 
de
1
 0 
Competitive wage ( ˆ cw ) 
d
s
s d
e f
e
e e
11
1
1
 d
d
e f
e
1
( 1)  f  
These expressions show that the impact of changes in exogenous variables depends 
on the price elasticities of demand and supply and on the indirect tax rate (or the share 
of producer‟s price in consumer‟s price). Since the large economy produces a tradable 
good, the price elasticity of demand for this good is assumed to be „reasonably‟ 
elastic, de f1 1/
6
. Then the impact of changes in cL , ,T LX  and H on the large 
economy can be summarized as in Table 4.  
   
  Table 4. Summary of signs 
Variables ˆ
cL
 
,
ˆ
T LX
 
Hˆ
 
Demand ( ,ˆTd Lq ) +  - 0 
Supply ( ,ˆTs Lq ) + 0 0 
Producer’s price ( ˆ pp )  - + - 
Consumer’s price ( ˆ ˆWc Tp p )  - + 0 
Competitive wage ( ˆ cw ) - + - 
As mentioned above, the small economy part of the model is solved through 
simulation using a set of parameters quite similar to those of the Northern Cyprus
7
 to 
calibrate the model.  Although the results are sensitive to parameters in value they are 
not sensitive in terms of signs. In other words, the impact of a change in the 
bargaining power of the union on the price of the non-tradable good in terms of 
                                                 
6
 In that case e f
d
1 0 . 
7
 Some of these parameters are calculated from official data and some are rough guesstimates. 
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direction is not sensitive to the parameter choice and therefore, the results are robust. 
Table 5 shows the values of parameters used in simulation and Table 6 summarizes 
the impact of changes in exogenous variables on the small economy. 
 
Table 5. Calibration parameters  
Parameters/ Values 
,N S  0.76681 ,N S  3.33330 gS  0.30000 ,N S  0.20000  0.70000 
,T S  
0.23330 ,LJ S
 
1.00000 
 
0.32773 
,T S  
0.70000 
S
 
0.25000 
LN
 
0.40000 ,LL S
 
2.33330 
 
0.75000 
,c S  
0.10000 
 
0.65000 
JN  
0.30000 ,JJ S
 
2.00000 
,T S  
3.33330 
T  
0.30000 
 
0.40000 
 0.70000 ,JL S  1.33330 ,N S  -0.83330 N  0.60000  0.75000 
 
 
Table 6. Impact of changes in , 
W
Tp  and cw on various variables of the small economy 
Variables 
 
ˆ
 
ˆW
Tp
 
ˆ
cw
 
Mˆ  
External Borrowing/Grant Hˆ  
- - - - 
Imported Tradable Final Good ,
ˆ
T SIM  
+ + + + 
Imported Tradable Intermediate Good N SJ ,
ˆ
 
+ + + + 
Labour Employed at Bargained Wage ,
ˆ
b SL  
- + - + 
Labour Employed at Competitive Wage ,
ˆ
c SL  
+ + + - 
Labour Employed at Non-tradable Sector N SL ,
ˆ
 
- + - + 
Labour Employed at Tradable Sector T SL ,
ˆ
 
+ + + - 
Non-tradable Intermediate Good ,
ˆ
T SN  
- + - - 
Non-tradable Price ,
ˆ
N Sp  
+ + + + 
Tradable Price ,
ˆ
T Sp  
- + - - 
Non-tradable Production ,
ˆ
N Sq  
+ + + + 
Tradable Production ,
ˆ
T Sq  
+ + + - 
Bargained Wage ,
ˆ
b Sw  
+ 0 + 0 
Non-tradable Consumption ,
ˆ
N Sx  
+ + + + 
Tradable Consumption ,
ˆ
T Sx  
+ + + + 
Income ˆSy  
+ + + - 
Disposable income 
ˆ
dy  
+ + + + 
Direct tax 
ˆ
St  
+ + + - 
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The imports (exports) by the small (large) economy are treated as exogenous for the 
large economy similar to the external borrowing (lending) by the small (large) 
economy. On the other hand, union‟s bargaining power, the world price of tradable 
good, the competitive wage are taken as given for the small economy. A change in the 
demand for exports from the large economy affects the consumer‟s (or world) price of 
the tradable good and the competitive wage which then affects many variables in the 
small economy. Therefore, the chain rule is used to show the direct and indirect 
effects of a change (a shock) on prices. 
Using these findings and the chain rule as explained it is possible to derive some 
important propositions about the effects of various changes on the performance of the 
small economy. The first exhibits a condition that needs to be pertained for the union 
to be highly influential on the wage rate.  
Proposition 1: The bargaining power of the union is more effective on the mark-up if 
the responsiveness of the intermediate good demand to wage rate is low (cross-price 
elasticity is between 0 and 1) and less effective when the cross-price elasticity is high.  
Proof:  Remember that , , ,
(1 )
1 LN JNb S c S c S
LN
w w w , i.e. the 
bargained wage rate depends on  the bargaining power,  and the term 
(1 )LN JN
LN
, which is the inverse of , 0
1
LN
JL S
LN JN
. If the cross-
price elasticity is low,
 ,
0 1JL s , then the magnifying impact of bargaining 
power on the mark-up is 
,
1
1
JL S
.  On the other hand, a high cross-price 
elasticity means a change in the wage rate increases the demand for the 
intermediate good, i.e. substitution of labour with intermediate good, and thus 
likely to decrease the mark-up union can bargain for.□ 
Institutional factors as well as the policy measures taken have significant effects on 
the performance of the small economy and vice versa. Combining the solution to the 
large and small economy parts of the model, it is now possible to look at the impact of 
institutional factors and policy changes. The large economy can seek to decrease 
unemployment or inflation. Impact of an increase in employment can be used to 
Northern Cyprus  S. Kayam 
understand the consequence of a policy measure to decrease unemployment on the 
small economy.   
Proposition 2: A policy adopted to decrease unemployment (or increase employment) 
in the large economy, increases the external borrowing required by the small 
economy. 
Proof: From the large economy system of equations we know that change in 
employment affects consumer‟s price, producer‟s price and competitive wage 
inversely. The small economy simulation shows that  
ˆ ˆ
,
ˆ ˆW
c T
H H
w p
0 0 . It is the 
consumer‟s price that the small economy takes as the world price of the tradable 
good. Therefore,
  
,
,, , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
W
Tc Lc T
W
c T Tc Lc L c L c L
pw pdH H H
w p pdL L L
1
0

.□  
As the need for external resources of the small economy increases, the large economy 
ends up providing more loans/grants but that affects the institutional background in 
the small economy in return.  
Proposition 3:  As the ability of the small economy government to finance its deficit 
through external resources increases, the bargaining power of the union increases.  
Proof: As mentioned earlier, the government finances its spending through taxes 
and external borrowing. The change in government expenditure , ,
ˆ ˆˆ
S c S c SG w L  
and finances ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )S S S SG g T g H  has to be equal
8
. Substituting in ˆ ˆ ˆS S ST t y  
and  by setting expenditures equal to finances, the change in budget can be 
written as  , ,
ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ(1 )( )c S c S S S S Sw L g t y g H . We get an expression that shows 
the relationship between government finances, expenditures and union‟s position:
 
, , ,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( 1/ ) [(1 )/ ]( )S c S c S b S S S St w L L g g G H  using the changes in 
income, wage and employment. Since  and  are both positive,  for ˆ ˆSG H
9
, 
                                                 
8
 Remember that /g H GS S .
 
9
 Taking the second derivative shows that 2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆˆ/ (1 )/ (1 ) [ ] 0c cg g g g w L H . In 
other words, ( )g  is a concave function. 
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i.e. the government covers part of the increase in its spending by increasing taxes, 
then ˆ/ 0Sg .□ 
Consequently, the change in the institutional environment has recursive effects on 
economic variables, such as imports and prices. 
Proposition 4: Increase in the bargaining power of the union increases the imports. 
Proof: Since ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) N SM oIM o J1  then 
,
,
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
N S
N S
JdM M IM M
d IM J
. From 
the simulation we know that all the terms in that expression are positive, 
therefore, the expression is positive.□  
 
Proposition 5: Increase in the bargaining power of the union increases the price of 
the non-tradable good. 
Proof: From the simulation we know that 
,
ˆ
ˆ
N Sp
0 .□  
The literature on union behaviour and inflation substantiates these propositions. 
Among the three alternatives that could be used to restore labour market equilibrium 
in the contracting region after a shock were decreasing wages, allowing or motivating 
emigration and fiscal expansion (Peters, 1995). The first two alternatives are out of 
question in the sense that decreasing wages would lead to the emigration and that is 
not preferable. Both the TR and NC governments want to keep the island populated 
for political reasons and this is why the fiscal expansion in the contracting region is 
financed by the expanding (large) economy. However, contrary to the claims of 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988), the results indicate that the unions can ignore the 
influence of nominal wage increases on prices even though centralization is high 
provided that supply of resources, i.e. finance, is relatively elastic. The finance 
provided by the large economy enables the union in the small economy to increase 
wages as suggested by Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994) depending on the „anticipation 
of government policies‟ or the ability of the government to finance its deficit as 
mentioned by Iversen (1998).  
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Moreover, a policy to control inflation in the large economy has repercussions for the 
small economy. Table 7 can be used to show the consequences of such a policy. If the 
large economy adopts inflation targeting measures and wants to decrease price 
volatility or impose price stability then that decreases the competitive wage.  
   
 Table 7. Impact of the changes in consumer‟s price on the large economy 
Variables ˆ/ cp  
Demand ( ,ˆTd Lq ) - 
Supply ( ,ˆTs Lq ) - 
Producer’s price ( ˆ pp )  + 
Employment ( ,
ˆ
c LL )  - 
Competitive wage ( ˆ cw ) + 
 
Proposition 6:  Policy measures taken by the large economy government to ensure 
price stability, increases inflation in the small economy if the tradable sector in the 
country overweighs the non-tradable sector. 
Proof: Inflation in the small economy can be calculated as the weighted sum of 
changes in prices of the tradable and the non-tradable goods, i.e. 
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
S N N S T T SP p p
 
where
 
,N T are the weights of these two sectors in the 
economy. Therefore, the impact of a change in the world price of tradable good 
on the small economy inflation is determined by   
 
, ,
, , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
N S T SS S c S c
Tc L N S c Tc L T S c Tc L
p pdP P w P w
dp p w p p w p
0
 
.This expression simplifies 
down to 
, ,
, ,
, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
N S Tc LS c
N S T S
Tc L c c Tc L
p pdP w
dp w w p
0 . In the simulations the 
changes in prices of tradable and non-tradable goods are calculated to be roughly 
equal, i.e. 
, ,
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
Tc L N S
c c
p p
w w
. In that case the relative size of the weights becomes 
significant. If , ,N S T S , as is the case of Northern Cyprus, then 
,
ˆ
ˆ
S
Tc L
dP
dp
0 . 
In other words, as ,ˆTc Lp decreases the inflation in the small economy increases. □
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6. Conclusion 
The model developed in this paper examines the consequences of policy measures 
adopted by the large economy on the small in the presence of currency union and the 
implications of restrictive institutional environment for the case of Northern Cyprus. 
In the model, NC is taken as the small economy and Turkey as its larger partner. 
Institutional factors, such as the trade embargo enacted by the international 
community and the repudiation it faces, causes the small economy to become more 
dependent on the large in terms of its trade and foreign funding. Implicit in the model, 
it is assumed that Turkey needs to keep Northern Cyprus populated to ensure her 
security and achieve some of her objectives. Additionally, the institutional 
environment and the structure of the economy, restrain the flexibility of the economy 
and the adjustment to external shocks. 
In this chapter, the consequences of policy change in the large economy on the small 
are examined. The policy measures considered affects the unemployment and 
inflation in the large economy. The direct effect of an unemployment decreasing 
policy in the large economy is in the direction of decreasing prices in the small. 
However, the indirect effects through institutional environment and through the 
borrowing requirement cause inflation. Similarly, stabilizing the prices in the large 
economy means inflation for its smaller partner.    
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